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Abstract

Among modern democracies, compulsory voting (CV) is institutionalized most prevalently in
Latin America. Latin American politics have a long, turbulent history, and governments in the
region have some of the highest rates of political corruption in the world among democracies,
especially electoral fraud. This study investigates the connection between these two phenomena.
Secondary empirical quantitative and qualitative research of political and cultural behavior are
analyzed according to a rational choice theory decision paradigm. Demographic, experimental,
and theoretical data regarding the effects of CV laws are considered in light of possible
incentives and disincentives for engaging in vote-buying. This study inductively argues that
compulsory voting increases the prevalence of vote-buying in Latin American democracies due
to the existence of regional clientelist networks that target poor and weakly opposed voters, the
demographics among whom turnout is most increased when voting is made compulsory. These
findings bear on the future of democratic practices and institutions in the West for the twentyfirst century.
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Compulsory Voting and Corruption in Latin America
The question of which members of a society ought to make authoritative decisions for the
whole is as old as philosophy itself. Jurisdiction and political participation have always been
issues of authority, legitimacy, practicality, and justice. Each consensus amidst the enduring
debate gives rise to its own consequent governmental, societal, and economic manifestations. As
successive waves of democracy have washed over the globe in the last two centuries, so have
universal suffrage and stronger forms of direct democracy. A substantial component in this
development is the adoption of mandatory political participation through the institutionalization
of compulsory voting, most prevalently in Latin American democracies during the twentieth
century.
Latin American politics have a long, turbulent history, and democracies in the region
have some of the highest rates of political corruption in the world, especially electoral fraud.
While there has been significant political science research devoted to both voting systems and
corruption, research relative to correlating these two phenomena is scarce and insufficient. The
string of new data that contradicts the prevailing opinion regarding the benefits of CV laws
renders this research even more necessary for this emerging field of political science. In light of
recent debates and countervailing laws regarding voter access in the U.S. as well as populist
trends in Western democracies as a whole, an exploration of the interplay between
decentralization, enforced political participation, and democratic ideals is highly relevant and
may bring much understanding to the development of political systems in the twenty-first
century. Drawing on existing empirical and qualitative research, this paper attempts to explore if
and how institutions of sanctioned compulsory voting increase the frequency of electoral fraud,
specifically in the form of vote-buying in Latin American democracies.
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Compulsory Voting

Historically, compulsory voting (CV) laws have been adopted for a variety of reasons. In
Latin America, many were passed along with packages of sweeping democratic reforms in
response to the widespread perception of corruption and political illegitimacy. Additionally, the
institutionalization of CV in Latin America seems to be the result of a tradition of formalizing
democratic ideals.1 There arose renewed interest in studying the institution of compulsory voting
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama expressed
support for a national CV law in the United States to counteract the influence of money in
politics.2 More recently, the abandonment of compulsory voting in Chile, multiple U.S. State
laws either restricting or expanding voter access, and a general rise in nationalism across the
globe have led to reassessments of many long-standing political practices.
Among modern-day democracies, those that enforce compulsory voting are
predominantly found in the Western Hemisphere. In these nations, legal retribution for failing to
provide verification of having voted in recent elections ranges from monetary fines to
imprisonment and infringement upon citizens’ civil rights. 3 In Peru, citizens are required to vote
in every election or face a fine. For the 2021 Peruvian General Elections, the Peruvian National
Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) announced the fines for failing to vote: 88 soles ($22.72)
for those living in non-poor areas, 44 soles ($11.36) for those living in areas that are not

1

Sarah Birch, Full Participation: A Comparative Study of Compulsory Voting (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2009), 27, ProQuest Ebook Central.
Jesse Byrnes, “President Obama Floats Mandatory Voting,” TheHill, last modified March 19, 2015,
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/236255-president-obama-floats-mandatory-voting. President
Obama intimated a version of the leveling argument, implying that a compulsory voting law would increase
representation among lower-income, minority, and young voters.
2

“Compulsory Voting,” International IDEA, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voterturnout/compulsory-voting.
3
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extremely poor, and 22 soles ($5.68) for those living in extremely poor areas. 4 Unpaid fines are
electronically tracked in conjunction with Peru’s lauded electronic personal identity system. The
National Document for Identification (DNI) is the only identification with which citizens can
vote. Citizens’ voting record is recorded and tracked via the DNI system, often through the use
of a sticker to indicate participation in the most recent election.5 If there are any unpaid fines on
a citizen’s record or if they do not have a sticker,
Restricted services include registering a birth or marriage, doing any transaction at public
or private banks, benefiting from the social security system or getting official documents
from the registrar. The restrictions also extend to accepting a job in the public sector,
taking part in any judicial or administrative process, signing a contract, or obtaining a
passport or a driver’s license, among others.6
In Argentina, citizens who do not vote and who do not submit a justification for are fined 50
pesos which can accumulate up to 500 pesos, and failure to pay the fine results in the inability to
carry out civil procedures or access civil rights.7 Similar situations exist in Brazil, Bolivia, and
Uruguay. The common sanction of fines tied to restrictions on access to public goods and state
services is occasionally coupled with the loss of voting rights or other, stricter measures.8

“Elecciones Generales 2021,” ONPE, accessed April 5, 2022,
https://www.onpe.gob.pe/modElecciones/elecciones/2021/EEGG/. Soles to dollars conversion calculated from the
average 2021 exchange rate according to “Peruvian Nuevo Sol to US Dollar Spot Exchange Rates for 2021,”
Exchange Rates, accessed April 5, 2022, https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/PEN-USD-spot-exchange-rates-history2021.html.
4

5

Mariella Gonzales, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, and Luis R. Martinez, How Effective Are Monetary
Incentives to Vote? Evidence From a Nationwide Policy, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science
Research Network, October 29, 2019), 9-10, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3304894.
6

Ibid., 9.

7
Micaela Cannataro, “Cuánto se paga de multa por no votar y cómo justificarlo,” Diario AS, last modified
October 26, 2019, https://argentina.as.com/argentina/2019/10/26/tikitakas/1572083703_938174.html.
8

“Compulsory Voting,” International IDEA.
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Table 1. Compulsory Voting in Latin America
Country

Year
Introduced

Sanctioned?

Argentina

1912

Yes

Bolivia

1952*

Yes

Brazil

1932

Yes

Chile

Practiced
from 19252012

Yes

Costa Rica

1959

No

Dominican
Republic

Practiced
until 2010

No

Ecuador

1947 for men,
1968 for both
sexes

Yes

Guatemala

Practiced
until 2010

No

Honduras

N/A

No

Mexico

1857

No

Panama

N/A

No

Paraguay

N/A

No

Peru

1933

Yes

Uruguay

1934 (Not
practiced until
1970)

Yes

Venezuela

Practiced
from 19581993

No

Source: adapted from “Compulsory Voting,” International IDEA, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voterturnout/compulsory-voting.
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Theoretically, in Chile prior to the 2012 reforms, nonvoters could be imprisoned as a sanction,
but the author is unaware of any documented cases.9
While some view mandatory voting and universal enfranchisement as a necessary step to
diffuse power from political elites and private interests, these laws may undermine the very
national ideals, democratic institutions, and egalitarian philosophies that they are intended to
promote. Arend Lijphart, in his renowned 1997 Presidential Address to the American Political
Science Association, argues that the benefits of compulsory voting laws far outweigh their
consequences.10 According to Lijphart, unequal participation means systemic class bias in
political influence: “low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout.”11
Coming from the position that low voter turnout results in undemocratic representation, Lijphart
contends that implementing compulsory voting laws would greatly increase voter turnout, which
would, in turn, increase political equality. However, Lijphart too hastily equates turnout with a
true representation of the public’s interests, and since 1997 multiple studies have emerged
detailing challenges to the democratic and progressive effects of compulsory voting laws. In her
book Full Participation (2009), Sarah Birch undertakes a comprehensive review of both the
normative and empirical academic literature published on CV before 2009. Of twenty-two
measured variables, Birch finds that mandatory electoral participation has no significant effect or

9

Ibid.

10
Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma,” The American Political
Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997): 1-14.
11

Ibid., 2.
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unclear effects on fourteen, including political knowledge and quality of representation.12 Birch
also finds that CV had a statistically significant positive (desirable) effect on six variables and a
negative effect on two variables, though all of her findings are limited by data availability, and
“the bulk of the statistical analyses reported in [her] volume are cross-sectional in nature, and it
is well-known that variations across states do not necessarily reﬂect the likely impact of an
institution in a given polity.”13 Annabelle Lever likewise claims that “the evidence suggests that
compulsory voting does nothing other than raise turnout.”14
Others have found evidence that compulsory voting may do more harm than good. In
Brazil, Gabriel Cepaluni and F. Daniel Hidalgo found that nonmonetary sanctions for
noncompliance with mandatory voting laws were found to increase voter turnout at a higher rate
among the higher educated than among the lower educated.15 As previously discussed,
nonmonetary sanctions often include access to state services, such as applying for a passport or
taking a civil service exam. According to survey of Brazilian voters, voters who had at least a
university-level education used on average almost twice as many state services that voters with

12
Birch, Full Participation, 140. The thirteen variables in which no significant effect was found are as
follows: political knowledge, political conversation and persuasion, propensity to contact politicians, propensity to
work with others to address concerns, party identification, propensity to participate in campaign activities, likelihood
of being contacted by a party of politician, quality of representation, electoral integrity, female representation,
support for small parties, support for the left, and support for the right. The effect on the proportion of non-random
votes cast was unclear.
13

Ibid., 140.

14

Lever, Compulsory Voting, 905.

Gabriel Cepaluni, and F. Daniel Hidalgo, “Compulsory Voting Can Increase Political Inequality:
Evidence from Brazil,” Political Analysis 24, no. 2 (2016): 273-80.
15
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only a secondary-level education, and over three times as many as those with only a primarylevel education.16 Cepulani and Daniel Hidalgo explain their findings by arguing that,
the cost to abstaining poor voters of being denied to state services is small when
sanctioned state services are rarely used by low income voters, especially when the fine is
low. For wealthier voters, lack of access to services generates incentives to comply even
when the monetary sanction is trivial.17
At least in Brazil, these state services are disproportionately used by upper and middle-class
voters that live in urban areas compared to lower-class and indigenous voters—those for whom
compulsory voting laws are intended to increase representation. Keith Jakee and Guang-Zhen
Sun find that compulsory voting may not result in a more accurate representation of community
preferences and that the resulting increase in the number of random votes may lead to the
election of the less popular candidate.18 The empirical research since Lijphart’s speech have cast
doubt on the usefulness of compulsory voting, though the field has by no means arrived at a
consensus. Moreover, normative arguments for and against the institution abound.19 It is clear
that mandatory electoral participation is not as straightforward as once thought. 20 The current
state of research leaves any aspect of the institution open to scrutiny.

16

Ibid., 274-275.

17

Ibid., 274.

Keith Jakee and Guang-Zhen Sun, “Is Compulsory Voting More Democratic?” Public Choice 129, no.
1/2 (2006): 61-75.
18

Annabelle Lever, “Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective,” British Journal of Political Science 40,
no. 4 (2010): 897-915; Annabelle Lever and Alexandru Volacu, “Should Voting Be Compulsory? Democracy and
the Ethics of Voting,” in The Routledge Handbook of Ethics and Public Policy (London, 2018), 242–254,
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315461731; Jason Brennan and Lisa Hill, Compulsory Voting: For and Against
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/compulsoryvoting/0F1DF41F6862A908BBC2B57C22D0E28C; Lachlan M. Umbers, “Compulsory Voting: A Defence,” British
Journal of Political Science 50, no. 4 (October 2020): 1307–1324.
19

“It is the great merit of arguments for compulsory voting that they force us to confront the complexities
and peculiarities of democratic politics. They do so, however, by appealing to our desire for simplicity. But
20
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Corruption in Latin America

The political history of Latin America is nothing short of tumultuous. The region’s
colonial history, social striation, recurrent revolutions, coups, juntas, thermidors, lack of public
accountability, and general deficiency (whether due to will or capacity) in enforcing the laws
have led to an almost constant state of political instability. Some states, such as Chile and
Argentina, emerged from the twentieth century more politically and economically secure than
others. In the twenty-first century, some Latin American governments have passed
decentralization reforms aimed at mitigating corruption and countering historical legacies of
authoritarianism with varying degrees of success.21 Nevertheless, widespread corruption has
come to dominate the ethos of politics in Latin America at all levels of government and
continues to threaten the political stability of the region as public dissatisfaction grows in
response to state officials’ evasion of the rule of law.
While not unique to Latin America, electoral fraud has been a well-observed
phenomenon from the earliest days of democratic governance in the region. Many forms of
electoral fraud, including electoral manipulation and vote-buying, are significantly present. In a
2019 study by Transparency International, one in four people are offered some form of a bribe in
exchange for votes.22 Vote-buying and clientelist relationships that provide incentives for
political support are widely believed to be prominent, but a large gap exists between the forecast

democracy is not simple. The idea that it is, or should be, is mistaken, and we have seen that it is a poor guide to
democratic ethics and politics.” Lever, “Compulsory Voting: A Critical Perspective,” 915.
21
Stephanie L. McNulty and Gustavo Guerra Garcia, “Politics and Promises: Exploring Fifteen Years of
Peru’s Participatory Decentralization Reform,” Public Organization Review 19, no. 1 (March 2019): 45–64.

Coralie Pring and Jon Vrushi, Global Corruption Barometer, Latin America & the Caribbean 2019 –
Citizens’ Views and Experiences of Corruption (Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2019), 24.
22
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of their prevalence in qualitative studies and instances of their occurrence in those that are
quantitative.
Measuring corruption is inherently more difficult than most crimes due to ambiguous
definitions of what constitutes corrupt behaviors, its clandestine nature, the relative lack of
evidence-trails, and its largely indirect consequences.23 The reliance on personal response
surveys and perception indices for data regarding corruption in general and vote-buying in
particular, renders analysis subject to many limitations, especially response bias. Social
desirability bias—the tendency to not admit to doing something that has some degree of social
stigma or legal consequences—has been found to influence respondents’ answers to survey
questions.24 Since the effects of social desirability bias were even observed in nations where
vote-buying and clientelist relationships have been long established, such as Nicaragua, the
actual extent of clientelism and vote-buying may be greatly underreported. Furthermore,
perceptions of corruption can be greatly altered by factors other than the actual amount of
corruption occurring. Not only are the most successful instances of corrupt behavior the most
undetected, but political agents also have many ways of serving their interests by increasing the
perceived legitimacy of an administration.25 One study from the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource
Centre evaluated the credibility and reliability of ten of the most widely cited claims about

Graham Brooks et al., “Measuring Corruption,” in Preventing Corruption: Investigation, Enforcement
and Governance, Crime Prevention and Security Management (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 27,
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137023865_3.
23

24

Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet De Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W.
Nickerson, “Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua,” American Journal
of Political Science 56, no. 1 (2012): 202-17.
Anita Breuer, “The Problematic Relation between Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin
America: Evidence from the Bolivian Case,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 27, no. 1 (2008): 1–23.
25
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corruption statistics. The authors found that none could be considered credible.26 Corruption
indices are hardly sufficient on their own to make any broad, extrapolated claims.
Nevertheless, corruption indices are still useful, especially over time as they evidence
relative change, but they may be significantly inaccurate as to absolute amount of corruption
occurring. Though currently they are probably the best tool available, extrapolating broad claims
from their data merits caution and speculation. Though corruption indices are by no means
authoritative, the most credible analysis of societal corruption will utilize both quantitative and
qualitative data to provide the most coherent and believable findings. Due to these limitations,
this paper attempts to logically synthesize the empirical data regarding compulsory voting,
turnout, and vote-buying with the qualitative research including political culture, psychology,
and philosophy via inducive argumentation.
Effect of Compulsory Voting on Vote-buying: A Social Model
As discussed, a purely quantitative model of corruption cannot justify any significant
conclusions regarding political culture. Any political theory that deals with human action will
have to draw from political psychology and philosophy. The aforementioned limitations and lack
of data collections, the weaknesses of applying cross-sectional results across different political
cultures, and the vast changes warrant inductive and abductive reasoning to reach the most
coherent explanation of the data.

26
Cecilie Wathne and Matthew C. Stephenson, “The Credibility of Corruption Statistics,” U4 AntiCorruption Resource Centre, last modified April 19, 2021, https://www.u4.no/publications/the-credibility-ofcorruption-statistics#accuracy-matters.
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Increased Turnout
There is much disagreement about the effects and ethics of compulsory voting, but
scholars almost universally agree that sanctioned CV increases turnout. Birch’s longitudinal and
cross-sectional analyses of available data from around the world “estimate that the introduction
and the abolition of compulsory voting were each ‘worth’ a turnout differential of
approximately” 13% and 12% respectively.27 In Latin America specifically, the impact is even
greater. Studies have consistently shown that Latin American countries with enforced
compulsory voting have significantly higher turnout than those with voluntary voting on average
across presidential and legislative elections.28 Figure 1, shown below on page 16, shows one
estimate of the difference in average voter turnout in Latin American countries in 2014 according
to data drawn from AmericasBarometer by LAPOP and IDEA International. While there was no
statistically significant difference between turnout in countries with voluntary voting systems
and those with unsanctioned mandatory institutions, countries with enforced compulsory voting
had around 20% higher turnout than either in 2014. This figure is notably close to Fornos et. al.’s
estimate of an 18% average increase across a much longer period, 1980-2000.
Investigations of other variables’ influence on turnout in Latin America consistently
show that the strength of any relationship is severely dampened by the presence of compulsory

27

Birch, Full Participation, 96.

28
Carolina A. Fornos, Timothy J. Power, and James C. Garand, “Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin
America, 1980 to 2000,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 8 (October 1, 2004): 926, 932; Arturo Maldonado,
“The Origins and Consequences of Compulsory Voting in Latin America” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University,
2015), 79.

COMPULSORY VOTING

15

voting laws.29 The base turnout rate is already so high in countries with CV that factors that have
a strong effect on turnout in voluntary voting elections make little to no difference in CV
systems. These indirect findings testify to the paramount consideration institutional factors merit
when researching the political environment of Latin America.
As seen in Table 1 above, the adoption of CV laws in most Latin American nations
occurred during the first half of the twentieth century, pre-dating most of the earliest data
collected for democratic and electoral indices and within the context of a greatly limited
franchise. Longitudinal studies about the effects of implementing compulsory voting laws have
largely been limited to data from nations with long-standing democratic histories, particularly
Australia, the Netherlands, and Belgium.30 When Chile abandoned the practice in 2012, it
provided a historic chance to observe the effects sanctioned CV had and to what degree a nation
with a long-standing history of effective CV would be affected by its formal abolishment; the
results were unsurprising. After making voting voluntary, Chile saw its turnout rate cut almost in
half, from around 87% to under 50%.31 If anything in the existing literature is clear, it is that
sanctioned compulsory voting increases turnout.

Miguel Carreras and Yasemin İrepoğlu, “Trust in Elections, Vote Buying, and Turnout in Latin
America,” Special Symposium: The new research agenda on electoral integrity 32, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 617;
Agustina Haime, “What Explains Voter Turnout in Latin America? A Test of the Effect of Citizens’ Attitudes and
Perceptions,” Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) 37 (2017): 79, 85.
29

30
For further discussion on the limitations of longitudinal analysis regarding CV, see Birch, Full
Participation, 80.
31

“Chile,” International IDEA, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/79/40.
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Unsanctioned Compulsory

Sanctioned Compulsory

Official Average Turnout

85.10%

65.10%

65.30%

Voting System

Figure 1. Average Voter Turnout in Latin American Countries, 2014
Source: adapted from Arturo Maldonado, “The Origins and Consequences of Compulsory Voting in Latin America”
(Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 2015).

Demographics of Turnout
While getting more voters to the polls is often discussed in scholarly democracy studies,
concern with who those voters are is less pronounced. Other than party affiliation and socioeconomic status, few studies cross-reference the change in voter demographics that takes place
due to increased turnout with the effects of compulsory voting laws. It seems that a good portion
of political scientists today think that higher turnout is a good to be sought for its own sake. As
Birch writes, “there is a general consensus among contemporary politicians and political
scientists alike that low rates of participation are unhealthy for a modern democracy.”32

32

Birch, Full Participation, 79.
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However, using legal force to coerce someone to act in a manner that is otherwise against their
will usually results in unforeseen consequences.
Jason Brennan is one of the most prominent contemporary Western critics of democracy.
In his book Against Democracy, he attacks the virtue of widespread political participation.
Brennan argues that voting is an act of governance and authority over other people, and that the
ideal voter is informed, perfectly rational, and prioritizes the long-run general welfare of the
society over his or her own short-term self-interest.33 No one perfectly fits this description, but
according to Brennan, the vast majority of people do not even come close. Brennan provides a
plethora of statistics and data that evidence how politically ignorant the average U.S. citizen is,
but his assessment is applicable beyond the United States.34 Brennan finds that most citizens
have a rational ignorance of political information since acquiring it always carries an opportunity
cost. It is rarely in the self-interest of the average voter to prioritize reading up on politics over
the multitude of other ways his or her time could be used.35
However, Brennan points out that “people who choose not to vote tend to know less than
people who choose to vote,” though those who vote regularly consume political information in
highly biased ways.36 Personal volition is extremely relevant given the impact of compulsory
voting. According to Brennan, “Being interested in politics has a stronger effect on basic
political knowledge than having a master’s degree.”37 Data from the Pew Research Center (PRC)

33

Jason Brennan, Against Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 5.

34

Ibid., 25-27.

35

Ibid., 30.

36

Ibid., 25.

37

Ibid., 36.
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undergirds and supports Brennan’s claims. In 2012, the PRC reported that, “Nonvoters are
younger, less educated and less affluent than are likely voters.”38 In 2006, a survey from the PRC
found that people who vote regularly were 46% more likely that people who are note registered
to vote to say they were interested in local politics, 49% more likely to view voting as a civic
duty, 24% less likely to claim they know little about candidates, and 18% less likely to say they
are bored by what goes on in DC.39 Summarizing the cumulative results of their 2012 News IQ
Quiz, the PRC reports,
Non-voters struggle with many of the campaign and other political knowledge questions.
On average, people who are not registered to vote answer 4.9 out of 12 questions
correctly compared with 7.2 among voters. Just 22% of non-voters know that
Republicans control the House of Representatives and only 23% know that John Roberts
is the Chief Justice of the U.S. On all twelve questions asked, voters are significantly
more likely than non-voters to answer correctly.40
Overall, a major takeaway from Brennan’s work is that those who choose to abstain from voting
in voluntary systems tend to be less interested in politics, less committed to one political party,
and less politically informed than their voting counterparts. This logical assumption has been the
basis for many theoretical models of vote-buying mechanics.
It is commonly accepted that inequality gaps in socioeconomic status—particularly in
education and income—are reflected in voter turnout.41 The correlation between education and

38
“Nonvoters: Who They Are, What They Think,” Pew Research Center, last modified November 1, 2012,
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2012/11/01/nonvoters-who-they-are-what-they-think/. All surveys by the Pew
Research Center referenced in this paper were conducted among the population of the United States.

“Who Votes, Who Doesn’t, and Why,” Pew Research Center, last modified October 18, 2006,
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2006/10/18/who-votes-who-doesnt-and-why/.
39

40
“What Voters Know about Campaign 2012,” Pew Research Center, last modified August 10, 2012,
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2012/08/10/what-voters-know-about-campaign-2012/.

John Bartle, Sarah Birch, and Mariana Skirmuntt, “The Local Roots of the Participation Gap: Inequality
and Voter Turnout,” Electoral Studies 48 (August 1, 2017): 30–44.
41
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turnout is widely accepted. The PRC reported in 2012 that 55% of nonvoters have only a highschool level education or lower compared to 32% of likely voters and only 13% of nonvoters are
college graduates opposed to 38% of likely voters.42 In their study of Latin American turnout
demographics, Yanilda González and Steven A. Snell found that in countries with voluntary
voting, the most educated are 24% more likely to vote than the least educated; in countries with
unsanctioned compulsory voting, 16%; and in countries with sanctioned compulsory voting,
7%.43 The income gap, too, is well-documented in the U.S. According to a survey by the PRC in
2010, “43% of nonvoters have family incomes under $30,000, compared with just 19% among
likely voters.”44 30% of nonvoters had family incomes in the $30,000-$74,999 range, and only
13% had family incomes over $75,000, compared to 35% and 32% of likely voters, respectively.
Furthermore, data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau shows a clear positive association
between family income and percentage of voter turnout.45 However, there is less agreement
about any statistically significant correlation of wealth and turnout in Latin America. This is
likely due to the prevalence of CV laws and their dampening effect of any other variable on
turnout, as previously mentioned and further supported by González and Snell’s findings.46 The

42

“Nonvoters: Who They Are, What They Think,” Pew Research Center.

43
Yanilda González and Steven A. Snell, “¿Quién Vota? Compulsory Voting and the Persistence of Class
Bias in Latin America,” (working paper, Harvard Kennedy School, 2015), 21,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/yanilda/files/gonzalezsnell_quien_vota.pdf.

Tom Rosentiel, “The Party of Nonvoters,” Pew Research Center, last modified October 29, 2010,
https://www.pewresearch.org/2010/10/29/the-party-of-nonvoters/.
44

45
Randall Akee, “Voting and Income,” Econofact, last modified February 7, 2019,
https://econofact.org/voting-and-income.

Carreras and İrepoğlu, “Trust in Elections,” 617; Haime, “What Explains Voter Turnout in Latin
America?,” 85; González and Snell, “¿Quién Vota?,” 21.
46
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mediating effect of the institutionalization of CV on turnout inequalities is a major argument for
its proponents. Known as the leveling argument, reducing turnout inequalities was the reasoning
behind both Lijphart and President Obama’s support for CV.
In sum, people of a higher socioeconomic class are more likely to participate in politics
than those of a lower socioeconomic class. Taken together, these factors indicate that voters in a
voluntary voting system are disproportionately richer, more educated, more politically informed,
more interested in politics, and more ideologically committed to a political party than nonvoters.
Therefore, since sanctioned compulsory voting increases turnout, it logically follows that the
implementation of CV will disproportionately increase voter turnout among these same
demographic groups.
Demographic of Vote-buying
With the understanding that sanctioned compulsory voting disproportionately increases
turnout among the aforementioned groups, the psychological connection to the propensity to
engage in vote-buying becomes much clearer. Most vote-buying models have generally assumed
that it is carried out by political machines which intentionally target weakly opposed voters—
voters who are the least committed to voting for one party or another. These people require the
least incentives to change their minds or secure their votes, thus the cheapest group to purchase
votes from. Susan C. Stokes’ analysis confirmed this general assumption using data from
Argentina, finding that political machines most frequently target people who are the most
moderate in their opinions of the parties running for election.47

Susan C. Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from
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Along the same line of reasoning, one would assume that the poor are most likely to be
targeted by vote-buyers than the rich. Contemporary research supports this assumption.
According to Gonzales-Octanos and Oliveros, “Scholars of clientelism in Latin America and
beyond generally agree that poor voters are disproportionally targeted with clientelistic offers.”48
In one study, lower-income individuals in urban areas were the most likely to be targeted by
political machines in Mexico.49 Though there are various reasonings behind this, a common
assumption is that people in poverty have greater needs and the relative value of any offered
reward is much higher.
The gist of the argument laid out above echoes the sentiment of American political and
judicial scholar Henry Julian Abraham, who during the mid-twentieth century wrote:
Which of the following voters would be more likely to accept an ‘honorarium’ for his
vote: He who goes [to the polls] of his own free will and choice or he who goes
grudgingly, feeling that he is giving time for which he ought to be recompensed?
Certainly the latter!50
Though Abraham touches mainly on the resistant or resentful aspect of mandatory voting, the
general expression of willingness to “make it worth one’s while” is applicable across the data.
Political machines are most likely to target weakly opposed and poor voters, the same groups of
people among which compulsory voting disproportionately increases turnout. Therefore, the

Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos and Virginia Oliveros, “Clientelism in Latin American Politics,” Oxford
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implementation of mandatory political participation increases turnout most among the groups of
people most likely to sell their votes.
Contextualization of the Model
The theoretical, empirically backed model above provides a strong argument for
believing that CV increases the frequency of vote-buying. However, it is entirely dependent upon
the culture in which it is applied to see if those most likely to sell their votes actually do. Most
likely to sell does not mean will sell. Being the most likely to sell their votes signifies the group
of people in an electorate who have the lowest inhibitions to selling their vote, are most willing
to sell their vote, or would require the least amount of incentivization to sell their vote. A
superlative designation such as this is relative to the disposition of the rest of the electorate; in
fact, it is only rendered meaningful in light of the overall level and range of public willingness to
engage in vote-buying or selling. Naturally, these cultural conditions will vary greatly between
and within nations and regions, but generally, the field of comparative politics has deemed it
appropriate to group and compare nations with their regions due to the existence of more
similarities than differences in most cases.
There is, of course, no existing, reliable quantitative metric of individual willingness to
commit electoral fraud. Even if there were, it would be subject to the same bias limitations of
assessing corruption levels discussed above. Therefore, whether those most likely to sell their
votes actually do depends on a qualitative assessment of human and cultural psychology. While
this study adopts a rational choice decision paradigm, it by no means assumes that the
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evaluations of decisions are monolithic.51 There are innumerable factors that influence daily
decision-making and alter utility calculation, many of which are incommensurable. In the context
of electoral fraud, this means it is not assumed that people will do anything for the right price, as
not every action has a corresponding monetary incentive.
Utility Maximization
The theoretically least likely in a society may be in actuality no more likely than anyone
else to commit voter fraud due to a thoroughly ingrained moral code or because the
consequences of getting caught far outweigh any potential benefit. If for whatever reason, a
nation values social order or the rule of law above all else, there may be no aggregation of other
incentives that could induce a citizen to break the law. Such strongly held values or principles
are herein referred to as one’s non-negotiables. Thus, a non-negotiable is a value that is always
prioritized in an individual’s decision-making to the degree that the utility it affords a choice is
incommensurate or insurmountable by that offered by the aggregation of any other combination
of values. For the prior example of law-breaking, suppose someone has the opportunity to steal a
loaf of bread. If someone has a non-negotiable value of obedience to the law, no valuation of the
enjoyment or sustenance the bread may offer could outweigh the commitment to following the
law, even if he or she were dying. Indeed, the notion of non-negotiables helps explain the belief
that some things are worth dying for. One’s moral code is often a non-negotiable, though it not
always need be, nor must a non-negotiable be of a moral nature. Such an understanding of

51
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rational choice theory disagrees with some common interpretations of the paradigm, but it is
deemed properly expressive and limited for this study.
Accordingly, utility maximization as generally understood in economics posits that each
individual always makes what he or she believes to be the optimal decision in any scenario. The
term “optimal” is preferred as opposed to words that may carry more moral or objective
connotations, such as “best.” The foundational criterion of assessment for which a decision is
determined “optimal” is commonly referred to as “self-interest,” the negative connotations of
which have led to historical criticism. Indeed, it is probably not the best term; however, it is here
understood as signifying the inherent subjectivity of the human mind and will. The individual
must be understood as the agent qua subject of human action and his or her subjective
assessment of the most optimal state of affairs as the object. Accordingly, the course of action
that the subject judges will achieve this optimal outcome is the optimal decision. A student may
know that it is morally superior to attend class, both absolutely and for his character
development, but he may still choose to sleep in if he values his comfort more than either of
these. This could be the case whether he genuinely believes his action is morally wrong or not.
Likewise, one may become a martyr for a cause, or a mother sacrifice her life for her child,
irrespective of whether they believe in an afterlife or a moral law. Thus, self-interest is here rid
of moral elements. The optimal decision in any situation is determined by the individual’s values
and subjective rational assessment, regardless of how objectively rational his or her value
judgments may be. How one’s values are established and prioritized—indeed, whether they
could even be rational—is beyond the scope of this paper and irrelevant to its thesis.
In sum, utility maximization as the motivation for human action accounts for the agent’s
subjective values, both moral and amoral, including individual non-negotiables. Comparative
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and quantified assessments of utility levels are helpful for the economist and political scientist in
gaining a better sense of what these values are. In many cases, behavioral models of rational
decision-making are justified as assumptions but must be evaluated in light of other data.
Since any value that is not a non-negotiable is, by definition, negotiable, most alternatives
can be analyzed along typical rational choice theory trade-off criteria. All that must be shown is
that selling one’s vote does not confront or infringe upon most Latin Americans’ nonnegotiables, and a significant amount of the population is willing to buy or sell votes, meaning
that the utility threshold to induce action is not generally above the current incentives that selling
one’s vote offers, for whatever reason. If vote-buying is not a non-negotiable, then it’s for sale. If
it can be shown that the current price is high enough for a significant number of people, then the
model argument of likelihood for participating in vote-buying is applicable to Latin America.
Accordingly, there will be good reason to believe that compulsory voting increases vote-buying
in Latin America.
The Latin American Situation
Three prominent considerations for determining whether vote-buying represents a
reasonable incentive in Latin America are moral/stigmatic reservations, legal repercussions, and
opportunity for action. These represent logical barriers to action if the disincentive connected to
each outweighs the incentives provided by vote-buying. Due to the lack of quantifiable data, this
comparison is addressed qualitatively.
Moral/Stigmatic Reservations
Moral and culturally stigmatic reservations are personal psychological factors that would
prohibit someone from engaging in an activity. Despite the limitations of corruption indices,
there is no doubt that vote-buying is prominently reported across Latin America. Figure 2 shows
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just one metric of the number of offers of bribery in exchange for votes in various countries.
Since this data is survey-based, it is subject to social desirability bias and is likely much lower
than actual rates, unless there is no social stigma involved. Either way, it undermines the theory
that engaging in vote-buying or selling is a cultural or extensive non-negotiable. To the contrary,
it appears that vote-buying is probably less stigmatized in Latin America than in most European
nations. This would be expected due to the normalization that results from the long-standing and
continual persistence of clientelism in the region. Lucy Taylor argues that, since the nineteenth
century, in Latin America clientelism has “dominated political relations and that its twin tools of
charisma and votes-for-goods allows it to thrive today in the form of neo-populism.”52 Taylor’s
work explores the substitution of citizenship in the political culture of Latin America with clientship—the political component of clientelism that is the “location and expression of agency.”53 If
this is the case, the threshold for utility incentivization to engage in vote-buying is probably
relatively quite low, though the social stigma will still have an effect on the reporting of the
activity, as previously discussed regarding social desirability bias.
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Figure 2. Vote-Buying Rates By Country
Source: adapted from Coralie Pring and Jon Vrushi, Global Corruption Barometer, Latin America & the Caribbean
2019 – Citizens’ Views and Experiences of Corruption, Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2019.

Legal Repercussions
Criminal behavior has long been analyzed according to renditions of rational choice
theory. Nobel Laureate economist Gary Becker famously formalized the modern economic
model of crime in his 1968 article, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.”54 The
theory behind the model is quite simple: people only behave in criminal behavior when the
expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. Sociological factors of crime merit nuance within
the model, but this basic principle holds in accordance with the model rational choice theory

Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 76, no.
2 (1968): 169–217.
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outlined above.55 The social stigmatic reservations also are analyzable within the economic
model of crime, but the focus of this section is the analysis of penal repercussion as deterrent to
engaging in vote-buying. This assessment includes the severity of both expected reward and
punishment as well as the likelihood of receiving either. W. Kip Viscusi posits a three-tiered risk
assessment for criminals consisting of chance of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment.56 Votebuying in Latin America does not provide a high risk of any for the average citizen and only
moderately higher risk of conviction and imprisonment for the politicians and patrons that buy
votes. Simon Nichter reviews scholarly data that shows the relative lack of prosecution of votebuying across Latin America, despite the prevalence of laws banning the practice.57 Even with
the increase in convictions for vote-buying in Brazil since the late 1990s, prosecution has mainly
targeted vote-buyers, not vote-sellers. The average citizen has little reason to consider legal
repercussions as a serious disincentive to the tangible and often immediate benefits of selling
their vote.
Opportunity for Action: Clientelism
As previously stated, in 2019 Transparency International estimated that one in four
people are offered some form of a bribe in exchange for votes in Latin America.58 It is generally

55
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assumed that the vast majority of these offers are done through clientelist parties. Clientelism is a
type of linkage structure or strategy that utilizes a patron-client or patron-broker-client
relationship; Gonzales-Octanos and Oliveros define it as “the personalized and discretionary
exchange of goods or favors for political support.”59 The Transparency International statistic and
the data in Figure 2 give an appropriate estimation of the pervasiveness of vote-buying and
clientelism in Latin America, but, as Gonzales-Octanos and Oliveros point out, “one of most
vexing questions in clientelism research is how to document the existence and pervasiveness of
an electoral strategy that is often illegal” and surrounded with some social stigma.60
Clientelist networks (or political machines) are one of the primary tools for the
mobilization of vote-buying in Latin America. In Mexico, an in-depth corruption report by
Mexican organizations Integralia and Mexicans Against Corruption and Impunity reports that
“for every peso recorded as an expense in a campaign, there are 15 pesos (approximately $1.30)
financed through unofficial backchannels from unknown sources,” that gubernatorial candidates
spend 10-times the legal amount in financing, and the most of this underhanded money funds
clientelism.61 Studies from various fields have documented the existence of these relationships
which are believed to be especially prominent among poorer and rural communities.62 Political
parties are often the apparatuses for clientelism, though sometimes there are intermediary
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brokers, such as crime organizations or businesses. In 2016, Peruvian candidate Keiko Fujimori,
daughter of the infamous former president of Peru Alberto Fujimori, and her right party Popular
Force were accused of violating electoral law by distributing to rural peasants mass amounts of
Tupperware that bore her party logo and contained cash inside.63 This sort of behavior is not
believed to be uncommon. The reality of clientelist networks in Latin America means that there
appears to be no lack of opportunity to engage in vote-buying for most Latin American peoples.
Suggestions for Future Research
This paper sought to determine if compulsory voting creates a political environment that
is more conducive to corruption in Latin American countries. Vote-buying is the most evident
form of corruption to emerge from compulsory voting laws, but there are numerous other factors
to consider. The possibility of corruption arises systemically relative to the purchasing of votes
but also retroactively, as bribery may be used to avoid the sanctions that would otherwise be
imposed on a nonvoter. Future research is needed to determine if such a relationship exists and
could be conducted along similar reasoning to the current study as to whether the incentives to
pay bribes to avoid sanctions are high enough to induce action.
Furthermore, the disparity in voting patterns between indigenous and non-indigenous
people in Peru in recent years, as well as the populist patterns that corrupt politicians were able
to utilize to gain support from these demographics, testifies further to the possible relationship
between voting laws and the corrupt exploitation by politicians who manipulate uninformed
voters.64 Electoral manipulation in this sense is much more loosely defined and controversial
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since the inherent limitation of knowledge concerning all aspects of potential candidates affects
every democratic election. Populism is not traditionally considered electoral corruption, but a
case could be made in instances where voters are purposefully denied access to information or
are fed false information by the parties in power, especially if it results in outcomes that do not
align with the true will of the public. Due to Latin American indigenous populations’ low
socioeconomic status, limited education opportunities, and relative lack of access to information
technology, it is likely they would fall into categories of people that are most likely to sell their
vote. Nevertheless, little data exists in this regard. There are many other social factors to
consider, but a better understanding of the levels of political information and interest in such
groups would be beneficial to Western democracies.
Conclusion
The most agreed-upon consequence of sanctioned compulsory voting is that it increases
voter turnout; more people go to the polls, but the success of the institution beyond turnout
depends upon the socio-political environment of the state in which it is adopted. Those who do
not vote in compulsory elections are generally the most weakly opposed voters—citizens with
much more moderate views and the lowest party loyalty. Also, due to the socio-economic gap in
voluntary voter turnout, poorer people are less likely to vote in Latin America. While CV
increases turnout for both these groups, these demographics are also the most likely to be
targeted by vote-buyers and political machines. Clientelist relationships are now welldocumented in Latin America, and political machines provide the best explanation for the
continued prevalence of vote-buying in countries that have both CV and secret ballots.
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There is strong reason to believe that compulsory voting increases the occurrence of votebuying in Latin American countries. Due to the prevalence clientelist networks and widespread
poverty in the region, compulsory voting likely increases the amount of vote-buying that occurs
in Latin American countries where it is enforced.
It remains to be seen whether, despite the increased risk of electoral fraud, the
implementing compulsory voting still results in political decisions that represent the public’s will
more accurately than the government would otherwise. The results are sure to vary among states.
Ultimately, it is up to the decision-makers and citizens of each nation to determine whether a
more accurate reflection of the opinion of the public is either procedurally or instrumentally a
more desirable and ideal form of government.
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